

SECRET

ER-1-9287

2 July 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Policy Coordination
Assistant Director for Special Operations

FROM : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT : Two Communications from General Willoughby

Attached are two communications to the Director from General Willoughby. There may be a few items of interest for each of you here. Kindly note and take any necessary action.

ALLEN W. DULLES

Attachments (3)
ER-1-9184

25X1AWD ☐

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MAJOR GENERAL C. A. WILLOUGHBY

ER-1-9184

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June 24/51

My dear Bedell

I am sorry I mislaid my address file. I trust that nothing went amiss in our latest correspondence? I had hoped to hear from you at Wedemeyers. Now I am here.

I can't say that I enjoy the climate or the East. What I have seen has been a continued disillusionment . . .

I recognized at once that the House and Senate Committees were at logger-heads, even competitive. I am in the middle in an unenviable position.

However, I have had them down here, for luncheon safely spaced apart and believe that I have become a sort of mediator. I think that I can establish lines of demarcation between them and develop some joint releases and joint action. I did not want to appear before these Committees anyway. However, they are impressed by my private book on Sorge and want it badly; they will distribute thru House and Senate and that will close that issue as far as I am concerned.

I feel confident that I can steer a middle course and not leave a bad taste, after all. Note draft of my statement (not for the Press whom I dislike thoroughly) on the occasion of first appearance. I do not think that anyone could consider this objectionable or an "attack" on anybody? Show it to Mr. Allen and his Brother.

I am still deeply concerned about Japan and the group I consider essential for re-armament. I fear that the remnants of the Gov Section aspire to become second Whitneys and interfere with the "depurge" process. Believe me, the future of Asia depends on that country. Note that the Prime Minister and the Cabinet came to Yokohama to see me off; that won't happen again soon? Ridgeway wanted me to stay and I still have a vague feeling that I should have seen the war out?--However, the Medicos gave me a bad jolt; I have a serious arthritis of the Spine, with all sorts of future complications. Rest is indicated - but I do not see it around here. I find the East and the Climate most uncomfortable and depressing.

I must soon make some decisions though I could remain here, in the shelter of my relatives, though one can overdo that sort of thing? I have seen the General briefly. He is on his own, in many ways, in a political program, in which I find no immediate place.

Let me hear from you, when the spirit moves you. Dr. and Mrs. Araki sent a "presento"; they failed to include a card. I have a present for you via later date.

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Cordially

/s/ Willoughby

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June 25/ 51

My dear Bedell

I am reluctant to bombard you with miscellaneous correspondence, but I received post from Tokyo, with data of interest to your organization. I think that I have given you priority on an interesting

25X1 [redacted] In the meantime, I have played around another one, with some tendrils into the Jap Government, via the old (and powerful Manchurian Railway - a very interesting enterprise in its days, what with Doihara and other talent involved). In that case, my own present favourable position with the Japanese Government is a collateral factor (A propos, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet came down to Yokohama to see my off; that's not going to happen again soon!)

25X1 I have also laid the bases for Yoshida's successor, Hatoyama. He was "purged" by the mischievous SCAP Gov Section but as actual head of the old Liberal Party, has slowly come back. I regret to say (and you are the only person to know it as of today: He has had a stroke yesterday which may impair his usefulness - or he may recover; he is slated to replace Yoshida, if and when) Actually, he headed the party when the "purge" hit him; he stepped down with the understanding that Yoshida would take his place, as a transient.

[redacted]

I am sorry that I left out there, though it seemed the logical thing to do. I am in for deep disappointments locally, however. Whitney has McArthur pretty well sown up, it seems. A strange relationship

Anyway, I will develop this channel by correspondence with my people; I use the possessive advisedly I treated them with intelligent benevolence; they are on the American side, when the Soviets could have garnered them in. Incidentally, if SCAP does not get off its high horse on re-armament and depurging officers, they may yet succeed. It is astonishing what military esprit de Corps can do; these pariahs of the Far Eastern Commissio have starved with quiet dignity - and remained nationalists.

Cordially

/s/ Willoughby

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My dear President, for the moment. It is a statement, not to the Press, but to the Chairmen of the committees, on the day of my appearance. It is obvious that I am trying not to offend anyone?

A Statement by Major General Charles A. Willoughby - MacArthur's
Chief of Intelligence: 1941 - 1951

Recent newspaper reports have developed a tendency to attribute sensational qualities to my impending testimony before certain Congressional Committees. I am described as "threatening a brand new ruckus," as being "sore at the Pentagon," as "vowing to jar the Capital with Spy tales"; yet another enfant terrible of the Press charges me with "promises to redden faces and to set off explosions," as being "a thorn in the side of the Pentagon."

Flamboyant headlines are understandable--if they remain within limits. While I am ranged squarely on the side of MacArthur--after all, loyalty is just as effective in Tokyo as in Kansas City or Washington?--there are certain facets to my presentation, in Congress, that I desire to record.

I have no direct issue with the Army or the State Department. The Army is sound. It was put to a most cruel test in Korea, and it has passed summa cum laude, as on many other historical occasion. After forty-one years' service, I leave the service with a feeling of regret. The Regular Army is a hard-task-master but it is also a delightful fraternal organization.

As regards the State Department, I have served as Military Attache for many years in our Embassies of Caracas, Bogota and Quito. The field personnel is first-class. The American diplomatic posts abroad are maintained with the dignity commensurate with a great nation. They operate in an atmosphere of sharp competition, since foreign establishments are on a more lavish scale usually paid for in lend-lease channels. Tokyo is a most conspicuous example.

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The real subject matter of my presentation is in a field of international danger, in which all political parties could meet amicably, on grounds of common interest.

There are recognizable historical factors, the dangerous impact of which is only now beginning to be felt. The dead hand of the past rests heavily on a precarious present. We are still in the shadow of Cairo, Yalta, Teheran and Potsdam. Retribution has been swift and terrible. The victors of 1945 have created a Frankenstein that may yet slay them: the Red menace, international Communism, though it is only fair to accept that the present Administration is staggering under an intolerable burden, that it inherited from its predecessors and did not itself create.

It fell within the purview of MacArthur's intelligence section to confront this menace in the Far East, to unmask the grimacing face of the red Medusa.

The story of Richard Sorge, Soviet master spy, became the vehicle of presentation. It has been covered recently, in its main features, by "Newsweek" and the "United States News & World Report"; however, their stories merely scratch the surface. For a period of years, Tokyo has filed with the War Department a most extensive documentation on Sorge, contained in over thirty consecutive "exhibits," aggregating over a million words, with hundreds of plates, photostats and illustrations.

While certain individuals emerge sharply in this report, they must be viewed against the sinister background of a world conspiracy, the essential framework of which should be known to our legislators and to our people. In its unimpeachable and devastating evidence, this case will dispel carefully nurtured, false notions on the responsibilities for the China debacle, and place this controversial subject into proper focus.

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The element which intrigued MacArthur's intelligence was the immediate recognition that Richard Sorge's story did not begin or end with Tokyo, but was only a chip in the general mosaic of Soviet Strategy.

An investigation was opened into the Shanghai period and the IIIrd Comintern "apparatus." In Shanghai, in the early Thirties, we are not dealing with the period of uneasy alliance with the Soviets, 1941 - 1945, but with the more significant prewar years of 1929 - 1939, in the heyday of the IIIrd Communist International, prelude to the infamous Stalin - Hitler pact, sole factor that made World War II at all impossible.

We are dealing here with a conspiratorial epoch in the history of modern China. Shanghai was the vineyard of Communism. Here were sown the dragons' teeth that have ripened into the Red harvest of today -- and the farm labour was done by men and women of many nationalities who had no conceivable personal stake in China other than an inexplicable fanaticism for an alien cause, the Communist "jihad" of Pan-Slavism for the subjugation of the Western World.

Most of the old wheelhorses of the American Communist party appear to have been operating in Shanghai, in one period or another, the professionals of the clandestine fraternity, as well as mere acolytes and dupes, flirting moth-like with the Red menace; there is Earl Browder, Sam Darcy, Eugene Dennis, Harry Berger, Gerhard Eisler and many others.

My cumulative reports contain over 180 identities, surnames, aliases, and code-designations, derived from Court records authenticated by American lawyers

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The exact degree of relationship or association ranges from direct espionage by Comintern "agents" to the twilight zone of fellow-traveling dupes

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and befuddled liberals -- apparently unaware that they have drifted into an international conspiracy for the sole benefit of an alien and hostile Government.

I have filed detailed evidence with appropriate Federal agencies and certain Congressional Committees. *(Let the chips fall where they may! As regards my personal fortune, it is supremely unimportant, and does not concern me; one of the Committees has already received letters threatening my life.)*

It is thus that I discharge my moral obligation toward the United States which has received me as an immigrant boy and given me shelter and citizenship as a man.

I have no doubt that the hue and cry will start again, as in 1949. I expect to be attacked by the Communist press, from the "China Digest," in Hong Kong, to the "Far East Spot Light," in New York. Orders will go out from the shabby loft building on 35 East 12th Street, New York. The red cells will discharge their indefatigable little workers. The pinko columnists will sharpen their quills. The "smear" brigade will swing into action. Some red "mouthpiece" will prostitute the law of the land and sue me for libel, as before, and I will accept, as before. Yet, in the cacophony of frenzied accusations, I am reminded of an ancient saying: "...It is better to fail in a cause that must ultimately succeed, than to succeed in a cause that will ultimately fail...."

* True but omit